Agreement Reality Sociology

Let us take this example: the reality of consensus for people following a certain thecroque religion is different from the consensual reality for those who follow another thecroic religion, or those who avoid thecroic religions in favour of science alone to explain life and the universe. 12 Let`s start with the first difference from the reductionist approach. In a sense, social objects have a nature that is independent of what people think of them. Specifically, social reality does not depend on particular subjects, as individual experiences and volitions do. Social reality requires social actions, that is, interactions of a particular type between individuals. But social acts are essentially different from intentional individual acts and personal experience, because they always involve more than one subject. Even more precise, it is not in the power of an individual that changes most of the social reality, not even with regard to the social facts in which he or she is directly involved. As in a play, it`s the configuration that counts. If you have a group of friends at your home for dinner, you play the role of a host. It is agreed that you will provide seats and seats and you will probably be stuck at the end of the night with much of the cleaning work. In the same way, your friends play the roles of guests, and they are expected to respect your property and all the rules you set (“Don`t leave the door open, or the cat will come out.”). In each scene, there must be a common reality between the players.

In this case, if you see yourself as a guest and others you see as a host, there are probably problems. Another way of looking at this concept is W.I. Thomas`s remarkable theorem, which says that “when people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas, 1928). That is, the behaviour of men can be determined by their subjective construction of reality and not by objective reality. For example, a teenager who receives a label several times – Overachiever, Player, bum — might live up to that term when at first he was not part of his character. 4In this document, we will advance an alternative to Searle, which is also sensitive to the intuition (II) of the “independence” of the social entities of individuals. We will argue that a certain type of social object, that is, documents — and more generally recordings of social acts — are the cause of social reality. The fundamental difference from the reductionist approach is that the content of collective intentions will not be so important to account for the ontological diversity of complex social realities such as ours.

For example, your school exists as a school and not just as a building, because you and others agree that it is a school. If your school is older than you, it was created by the agreement of others before you. In a sense, it exists in consensus, both before and today. It is an example of the process of institutionalization, the act of registering a convention or a standard in society. Remember that the institution, although socially constructed, is still quite real. The connotation of the term “consensus reality” is generally pejorative: it is generally used by idealistic, surrealist and other anti-realistic theorems who oppose or are hostile to this “reality”, with the consequence that this consensual reality is more or less created by those who live it. (The term “consensus reality” can be used more flexibly to refer to generally accepted beliefs.) However, there are those who use the term authorization for the practical benefits of all appointments on a common set of assumptions or experiences. [8] Considering the nature of reality, there are two general approaches: the realistic approach, in which there is a single, objective global reality, which is supposed to exist independently of the perception of a particular individual, and the idealistic approach that an individual cannot verify anything other than his own world experience and never knows